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The Return of the Lost Father
By Samir Kassir
Annahar: May 6, 2005
There is always joy in the return of exiles and the return of General Michel Aoun is no exception, save for the case of his worst enemies. No one in Lebanon should view with disfavor the joy with which his supporters will receive their hero tomorrow Saturday. No one can, as well, hide the sectarian dimension of this return whether for General Aoun - after 15 years of exile - or for the crowd of his old supporters, and the new ones amongst them. But Aoun, who wanted for himself a political and national role, certainly realizes that his return is not an emotional event only. This return is a political event and falls under political and journalistic assessment, even if any kind of assessment would take into consideration "the party of the General," not because of the General himself, but because the potentials of his supporters who have been - among others - the ammunition for the new Lebanon and who have been at the core of the making of [Lebanese] independence. Perhaps General Aoun cannot fall under assessment and questioning, especially that he will return a week after he has been assessing others, issuing verdicts in all directions and through all [TV] screens. By the way, the primary results of these daily appearances led to the distortion of Aoun's image, leading to the fading away of the image of the lenient politician of the past few months in favor of a peoples' leader who addresses crowds with a simplistic military logic that carries within it instigation against the political class. This way, at least, no one will wrongly assess him: The returning Aoun is the Aoun that never changes, the one who judges others but is never to be judged. But standing by the principles of the Independence Uprising mandates that all of its supporters not spare themselves of the winds of change and freedom this uprising has created. And if it were understandable, or rather likable, for the public opinion to put the leaders of the opposition at stake, there is no reason why Aoun should be an exception. On the contrary, if there were takes against X or Y that they did not live up to the promises of change that the uprising had unleashed, Aoun - for his part - gives the impression that he does not give any consideration for those who were behind this uprising for he presents himself as the father of independence and claims that it was him who brought back to Lebanon its sovereignty and freedom. Those who are close to him often describe him as "the liberator" and "Lebanon's coming Spring" in addition to other descriptions that claim the efforts of a whole population. It might be understandable, against the background of an electoral campaign, that Aoun ignores the role of Walid Jumblatt [in the uprising] or [Jumblatt's] virtue of putting his head under the guillotine [during that uprising]. And it might be also understandable - in the same context - that Aoun considers the assassination of Rafik Hariri as merely the spark which ignited the uprising and in which the slain premier had nothing to do. Aoun might also want to forget how Marwan Hamade miraculously survived assassination. It might be logical from Aoun's point of view to condescend the Qornet Shehwan Gathering and all the Maronite politicians other than him. He might also stay at a distance from Patriarch Sfeir - even if he does not say it - and blame the Lebanese Forces because its supporters did not join the protests that he used to call for. But what any impartial logic cannot accept is for Aoun to ignore the role of popular mobilization in achieving independence. Perhaps the biggest irony is when Aoun justifies his claim by arguing that he brought back independence and sovereignty by highlighting his role behind the shift in the international view of Syria without giving any credit to the active role of the Aounists on the ground, lest we talk about others whom he would want to forget about! To him, it looks as if addressing "the great people of Lebanon" is as easy as uttering these words only. The issue goes beyond a single individual claiming credit for that historic event according to a manipulated understanding of the De Gaulle experience in France. If ignoring the dimension of the popular size of the event came out of a presumed superior understanding of politics, then ignoring the role of other political forces indicates that there has been a misunderstanding about the meaning of this last [independence] confrontation. The biggest mistake that Aoun as well as other Christian factions might be committing, is to consider the Independence Uprising as the completion of one of the episodes of the civil war. In this consideration, there are two historic misconceptions at least. The first misconception lies in confusing the role of the Syrian rule during the war, which had taken different shapes but had always been destructive, and the complex mandate system that [the Syrian rule] erected in Lebanon after the war by benefiting of what had befallen the Lebanese society during the last two chapters of the war between the years 1988 and 1991 - that is specifically during Aoun's days - and after the manipulation of Taef due to Aoun's rejection of it. The second misconception is that the opposition of the Lebanese society to the mandate did not operate according to a military logic of exterminating the other. This opposition rather invented new collective and democratic tools. And while it remains unacceptable to ignore the role of the Aounists in these opposition networks, it is also worth reminding that the Aounist movement deprived itself for many years from further activating this role on the premise that the post-Taef state was illegitimate. Certainly, the Aounists were not alone responsible for boycotting [the parliamentary] elections of 1992, yet their ongoing elections boycott in 1996 obstructed the broadening of parliamentary opposition, which was incarnated in its refusal to support the extension of [former] President Elias Hrawi's term. The Aounists became aware of their error in the 2000 elections and later during two follow-up by-elections. Along these lines, [Aoun's] logic of boycotting state institutions might have been one of the factors that delayed the formation of a broad opposition front and therefore the formation of the trap in which the mandate system fell. But jumping over the post-war era and its opposition - that was not less courageous than the courage of exile during which there was the building of the principles of a new democracy - does not only undermine the importance of the Independence Uprising, but also casts doubt over the idea of reform which Aoun is now calling for after he had stayed - and kept his supporters - away from this [reform] workshop for 15 years. Yet, if he recounts that [1990 - 2005] era, he won't only discover that some of his allies in the battle for independence were part of the authority - as he has been saying for days - he might as well realize that doubting these politicians was what paved the way for the establishment of the security system. Aoun has maintained this kind of doubt today as he tends to undermine the responsibility of the military - starting with the president of the republic whose term has expired and ending with the leaders of the [security] apparatuses of darkness - in leading the country to where it is now. Those who blame Aoun for exterminating others cannot call in return for the extermination of Aoun's role or deny his importance and characteristics for there must be "something" about Aoun that brings to him the support and loyalty of activists who might be of the best that this country has produced. Those activists have sacrificed all what is precious to them for they have believed in an idea which they have always seen incarnated in this man even if they sometimes had to go against their convictions whenever he decided so for reasons they could never grasp. Loyalty to the might of those supporters and their commitment is what makes of tomorrow a day for celebration worth of the respect of all the Lebanese. This requires special attention from Aoun whereby he should not come forward as the father of independence because that way, he would be losing the meaning of the [Independence Uprising] achievement. Perhaps the biggest gift Aoun presents to his citizens on his day of return is for him not to come victoriously but to show up cheering for a victory that he and others prepared for and that the Lebanese, from all walks of life, made without any aim at monopolizing it.
A time to Rethink
openDemocracy: September 18, 2001
An Uprising within the Uprising
Annahar: April 1, 2005
Beirut is the Spring of Arabs
Annahar: March 4, 2005
Disorder in Lebanon
No nearer to national reconciliation
Le monde diplomatique: February 1997
Searching for the Ugly American
Annahar: October 3, 2003
The Dream Statement
Annahar: January 28, 2004
The Return of the Lost Father
Annahar: May 6, 2005
When Hariri is in the Opposition
Annahar: Feb. 4, 2005
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