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When Hariri is in the Opposition
By Samir Kassir
Annahar: Feb 4, 2005
What is Rafik Hariri waiting for? The Syrian rule has pushed him to an opposition stance while the Lebanese authority deals with him on the basis that he is now in the opposition. The opposition itself expresses solidarity with him as if he is one of its basic components. But he prefers to wait as if he has another option. He restricts himself to delegating MPs close to him to the opposition's meetings while he doesn't resolve his stance. In the past, Hariri accustomed us to his contradictory calculations to the extent that he wouldn't make a choice in the right time and often ends up twisting before the storm and missing one chance after another. But where is the storm today? If there were any storm today, it would not be blowing in the direction Damascus-to- Beirut, as Hariri knows from his repeated meetings with western ambassadors. Hariri knows, more than others, that any storm now would not threaten with a final breakup between him and the Baathist rule, since such a breakup has already happened ever since the pillars of the rule in Damascus have been convinced - even if erroneously - that Hariri was behind the UNSC Resolution 1559. And if he still maintains some friendships over there, he knows - no doubt - that these friendships have become weightless in what is left of the Baathist formula. Or, could it be his pan-Arab heart - like he used to sometimes claim - that has been stopping him from being on par with Walid Jumblatt? It needs "the innocence" of Assem Qanso to make one think that pan-Arab nationalism justifies tyranny and dictates that the Damascene rule suppresses Lebanon, after Syria, under the rule of its mafias. Perhaps the reason behind Hariri's delay is that he is simply waiting for his moment. But, that way, wouldn't he be risking missing that moment or missing the opposition? Whether Hariri joins the opposition or not is not a done deal. If joining the opposition is not easy for Hairri, it is not easy for many factions of the opposition. Indeed, the situation of the opposition with Hariri is thorny: without him it loses a lot and with him it risks a lot. Facing his decisive electoral weight in more than one district, not only in Beirut, there is a difficulty marketing him among the factions that do not originally support him. In this context, Hariri doesn't have a lot of time, in the same manner that he doesn't have complete maneuvering freedom due to the hardship in marketing his image. It might be his duty, however, should he decide to join the opposition and make it succeed, that he help his allies market his image - more accurately - and help them undo the great controversy that has engulfed his experience while in power. The issue is not for Hariri to present his independence credentials for whenever he endorses the Bristol Document, he would have adopted the whole document - even if he marks his reservations against this or that item - like many others in the opposition have done before him. Endorsing the Bristol Document would not be a commitment on his part to the opposition until forever since Hariri's doubts - even if legitimate- are present among all factions of the opposition. Casting them away, however, only comes from the potential success of the [new] republic [electoral] ticket that the opposition is currently in the course of forming. Meanwhile, the opposition should maintain its current dynamics that have been the secret behind Walid Jumblatt's daily "escalation." Here too, as is the case with some Christian opposition factions, there must be utmost honesty. This means that the prerequisite for the correction of Hariri's image - should he decide to publicly join the opposition - is related to what Hariri considers to be his point of strength, that is his political and financial weight on one hand, and his platform for the country on the other. Hariri needs to redraft his platform if for nothing; he needs to dismantle the formula that led his national project to become synonymous to the enormous public debt. This is to say that Hariri should refute, if he could, the charge that blames him alone for these debts. But this would mandate that Hariri employs some kind of political behavior that has not been in line with his political habits. The nation's bad finances cannot be blamed on Hariri alone, even if it is impossible to ignore his responsibility there. The share in responsibility of the two successive presidents and the only speaker of parliament that Hariri dealt with, in addition to other partners, should be also highlighted [whenever talking about Lebanon's public debt]. Furthermore, no one should forget the [high] cost of the security apparatuses or what has been deducted at the hands of the Lebanese-Syrian mafias. If Hariri ever does this kind of revision, he would then have decided to cut off from any possibility for a compromise, truce or even surrender that have long characterized his experience in power. Redefining his past platform, however, does not mean that he should not define his future project particularly when it comes to his preferred tax policy that has been based so far on reshuffling taxes so that their incidence lands on the biggest number of citizens while reducing the burden on wealthier individuals and corporations. Surely this economic school dominates the world today, yet it is not the only available one. What is demanded of Hariri, in any case, is for him to give up on his stubbornness in defending his finance and tax policies and on his logic that says: "I alone am right and all other kinds of talk are a matter of useless theory." This leads us to Hariri's financial and political weight that has always allowed him to act unilaterally, save for when he interacts with those who possess enough power. With those, Hariri is used to get lenient and surrender. With others, he had the buying of votes and sometimes threats. This is to be added to his impatience with the media whenever he didn't need it. Even if it were true that Hariri had changed his practice ever since he was kept out of power during the first two years of the rule of President Emile Lahoud, for several groups, Hariri still lives in the shadow of his old reputation. Whenever Hariri becomes opposition, he won't be a new man. Fair enough... at that point, his situation would be like that of most of his potential allies in the opposition. But if Hariri becomes opposition and intends to see the opposition vanquishing, he has at least to see in this new page a golden opportunity for him to renew himself, hopefully he won't miss it this time.
A time to Rethink
openDemocracy: September 18, 2001
An Uprising within the Uprising
Annahar: April 1, 2005
Beirut is the Spring of Arabs
Annahar: March 4, 2005
Disorder in Lebanon
No nearer to national reconciliation
Le monde diplomatique: February 1997
Searching for the Ugly American
Annahar: October 3, 2003
The Dream Statement
Annahar: January 28, 2004
The Return of the Lost Father
Annahar: May 6, 2005
When Hariri is in the Opposition
Annahar: Feb. 4, 2005
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